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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Q F T H E S T A T E Q F U T A H 
il. T A T ? . OJ< Ml A H , 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
WTLLIAM COLEMAN, 
D e fendant-Appellant. 
OR; » J I.. ur/hb 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
Appeal from defendant-appellants convict;k/n - f thn "nun (' 
possession of a dangerous weapon h 1 runvicted person. 
DISPOSITION i .n>:h:t COURT 
Defendarr-appeJiam y-;\? - w ^ v * . nossessicn 
of a danr'v"x -~ , ': * * * «• .. :. . r - a . V;-
 s-ry was > ^ ; 
and the cv- ,VH: n^ar; before the Hcr.cralJe al\"ir. I , -:. J\.^ 
Second Judicial 7'ist ^  ^J -.•"- . - • •./ : ,: *\, ~a. » ^  -r-fena-
ant-app^1 LJ ml wr L mii/iuted as charged and sentenced to a term of* not 
more than five years in the Utah State Prison. He Is present J) i1 i .11 • 
erty on bond pending appeal. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the aforesaid conviction on the grounds that application 
of the statute to him is ex post facto and that the statutory defin-
ition of the class of persons prohibited from possessing weapons is 
unconstitutionally vague; in the alternative, the defendant-appellant 
respectfully requests this Court to remand his conviction for sentencing 
as a misdemearnor in that either the weapon possessed by defendant-appell-
ant does not fall within the statutory definition of a firearm or that 
said statutory definition is similarly unconstitutionally vague. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
« 
William Coleman was charged with possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a convicted person, a violation of section 76-10-5039 Utah 
Code Annotated, which statute was enacted in 1973 as part of the New 
Utah Criminal Code and which had no comparable provision in prior stat-
utes. Subsequent to the filing of the information, and at the defendant's 
request, the state filed a Bill of Particulars indicating that the State 
was relying upon the defendant's 1969 conviction of assault with a deadly 
weapon in placing the defendant in the class of persons now prohibited 
from possessing dangerous weapons. At trial, the State put on evidence 
that on November 12, 1973 > the defendant had had a rifle in his poss-
ession and that he was the same William Coleman as that shown by copies 
of Court records to have been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon 
on April 18, .1969, in Weber County, Utah. It was not shown what weapon 
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had been employed by defendant in the 1969 conviction. 
POINT I 
THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH WILLIAM COLEMAN IS CHARGED 
IS RETROSPECTIVE AS APPLIED TO PERSONS WHOSE STATUS 
ARISES FROM ACTS PRE-DATING THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF 
THE STATUTE. 
At the time William Coleman was convicted of assault with a 
deadly weapon, the Utah Code provided that a person guilty of such 
offense was punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison for not 
more than five years, or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or by 
both. Section 76-7-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953- The 1953 Penal Code 
did not define deadly weapon nor did it prescribe any punishment for 
the offense other than that set out above. The code did, however, pro-
vide for certain collateral consequences of some types of convictions, 
as set out below: 
76-1-17: Felonious misconduct in office forfeits 
office and disqualifies: The conviction of any 
state, county, city, town or precinct officer of 
a felony involving misconduct in office involves, 
as a consequence, in addition to the punishment 
prescribed by law, a forfeiture of his office, and, 
disqualifies him ever afterwards from holding any 
public office in this state. 
76-1-36: Sentence for less than life - Suspends 
Civil Rights, forfeits private trusts and public 
offices - A sentence of imprisonment in the state 
prison for any term less than life suspends all 
civil rights of the person so sentenced during 
such imprisonment, and forfeits all private trusts 
and all public offices, authority or power. 
76-1-37: Sentence for life - Prisoner deemed 
civilly dead. A person sentenced to imprisonment 
in the state prison for life is deemed civilly 
dead. 
3 
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Applying all of these statutes to William Coleman, we find that 
on April 18, 1969* the state possessed the power to imprison him for 
not more than five years, to fine him not more than $1,000.00, to sus-
pend his civil rights for so long as he was in prison and to remove him 
for any position of private trust or of public office, authority or 
power. It did not have the authority to forbid him from ever again 
owning or possessing a dangerous weapon. Now it is claimed by the 
state that a law enacted nearly four years later gives it that addit-
ional power. Clearly the statute in question is retrospective as applied 
to William Coleman; the issue is whether or not such a retrospective 
law is considered as ex post facto under either the United States or 
the Utah Constitutions. Article I Section 9 of the United States Con-
stitution provides that "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law 
shall be passed,lf the following section prohibits states from passing 
any such laws. The Utah Constitution has a nearly identical provision 
in Article I, Section 18 which differs only by including a prohibition 
against laws impairing the obligations of contracts. 
The usual starting point for any discussion of ex post facto 
laws is the early case of Calder v. Bull, 3 Call 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648. 
There the United States Supreme Court set out four categories of laws 
deemed ex post facto: 
1. Every law that makes an action done before the passing 
of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and 
punishes such action. 
2. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than 
it was, when committed. 
4 
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3* Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a 
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, 
when committed. 
4. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and 
receives less, or different testimony, than the law required 
at the time of the commission of the offense^ in order to 
convict the offender. 
An examination of the case law on this subject discloses no 
consistancy of decision whatsoever in applying these principals. In 
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S. Ct. 573. 42 L.Ed 1002 (1889), 
the United States Supreme Court held in a bitterly divided opinion 
that the State of New York could, in 1893. legislate away the right of 
a doctor to practice his profession because he had been convicted of 
a felony in 1878. The majority felt that it was a valid exercise of 
the legislative power to protect the public by precluding felons from 
the practice of medicine and thus, though retrospective, the statute 
was not punitive in nature and not prohibited by the ex post facto 
clause of the Constitution. The dissenting justices opined that, if 
depriving a man of his livelihood was not punitive, then nothing was. 
The Hawker case has generally been followed and the Federal Gun Control 
Acts, passed following the death of President Kennedy, have been upheld 
by the Federal Courts as being valid exercises of the police power. 
United States v. Donofrio, 450 F. 2d 1054 (C.A. Florida); United States 
v. McCreary, 455 F. 2d 647 (C.A. Kentucky). 
It has been held ex post facto to provide that a person whose 
term of imprisonment has been served in less than the stated period 
because of statutory "good time" must be transferred to parole status 
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rather than merely released. People of United States ex rel Umbenhower 
v. McDonnell, 11 F. Supp. 1014 (N.D. 111. E.D., 1934). Laws dealing 
with parole have been sometimes held not retroactive on the theor;y a 
prisoner has no right to parole, Voorhees v. Cox, 140 F. 2d. 132 
( CA. Mo. ) who ]e other Courts have held that anytime the rules 
are changed to the disadvantage of the defendant, the law is ex post-
fact o. State ex rel Woodward v. Board of Parole, 99 So. 534 (Louisianna). 
The passage of a procedural statute permitting the joinder of defen-
dants for trial under circumstances which would have required severance 
at the time of the crime has been held not ex post facto. Paul v. 
State, 483 P. 2d. 1176 (Okl. Cr. 1971). Again, on the other hand,. 
reducing the number of trial jurors has been held unconstitutional 
when retroactive, Thompson v. Utah, 18 S. Ct. 620, 170 U.S. 343, 42 L. 
Ed. 1061. 
More comparable to the situation here are the political cases 
which deal with statutes requiring oaths as to past loyalty or limiting 
the activities of members of the Communist Party of America. Such stat-
utes have generally been attacked as being either ex post facto or, 
where that argument was not applicable, its highly analogous sister: 
a bill of attainder. Such laws have usually fallen in the face of this 
type of attack. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 L. Ed. 2d. 
484, 85 S. Ct. 1707 (1965). The pattern that emerges is that, if the 
reviewing court deems the social intent of the legislature to be desir-
able, then imposing a disability on an individual because of past conduct 
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will not be held ex post facto despite the retrospective effect* The 
United States Supreme Court has even enunciated such a principle as 
controlling; in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 2 L. Ed. 2d, -^w, W S. 
Ct. 590 (1958) the Court considered a statute which permitted a Court 
martial to strip a deserter of his citizenship. The statute was held 
unconstitutional; however, there was no uniformity among the justices 
as to the grounds of the decision. In the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice 
Warren, joined in by three of the four other majority justices, the 
subject of ex post facto laws was considered at length. The opinion 
stated that to come within this prohibition of the Constitution the 
law must be penal and that if the statute imposing disability because 
of past conduct has as its purpose some other legitimate government 
purpose, it will not be held penal despite the admittedly penal effect 
it has on the members of the proscribed class. Ibid, 2 L. Ed. 2d. at 
639-40. 
There is little authority on this point In Utah as State v. 
Carrington, 15 U. 480, 50 P. 526, which permitted a reduction in the 
number of grand jurors; and State v. Bates, 14 U. 2939 47 P. 78, a 
reduction in the number of trial jurors, were both cases dealing with 
procedure and both were overruled by implication when the United States 
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Thompson 
v. Utah, supra, and held that the number of jurors was a serious right 
and could not be reduced as to offenses committed prior to the legis-
lature making the change. 
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Although it is most probable that a federal court would not 
f: nci Utahf s new gun control law violative of the United States Consti-
tution, the Utkh Constitution remains to be considered in the light 
of the interpretations placed upon it by our Supreme Court. In People 
v. Flynn, 26 P. 1114 (Utah 1891) that Court considered whether or not 
a prisoner for felony could be tried while a prisoner. In holding 
that he could be so tried the Court considered the disabilities set 
out in Sec. 4749 > Comp. Laws 1888, identical to our Sec, 76-1-36, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ^ and ruled that "...no consequence follow 
a conviction for felony except those declared by statute." Ibid, 1115. 
The case at bar is one of first impression for this Court which 
must deal with the retrospective application of this statute in terms 
of the Constitution of Utah. Thus this Court has the option of deter-
mining that while the application of this statute to Mr. Coleman does 
not, according to the federal decisions in gun control cited herein, 
violate the United States Constitution, it is, nonetheless contrary 
to the Constitution of Utah. 
In essence then, the principle to be determined here is whether 
or not the Constitution of Utah permits the legislature to add a dis-
ability because of a prior offense so long as the disability is socially 
desirable. Indeed, it may well be true that society is better off if 
William Coleman does not own a gun; however, the principle to be deter-
mined here goes far beyond the facts of this situation. If we follow 
the federal cases on gun control legislation, then we will be adopting 
8 
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a principle which would also say that the Utah legislature could, for 
example, pass a statute which would forbid anyone from driving an auto-
mobile who has been convicted of speeding in fhe prior three years. 
That too might be socially desirable in the minds of some persons. 
Yet; obviously, it adds immeasurably to the consequences of a past 
event even though it does not, technically•, increase the fine or 
other punishment. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT IS CHARGED IS 
FATALLY VAGUE AND THEREFORE, ANY CONVICTION BASED UPON 
SAID STATUTE WOULD BE VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS. 
Sec. 76-10-503, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 1973, provides 
as follows: 
Any person who is not a citizen of the United States 
who has been convicted of any crime of violence under 
the laws of the United States, the State of Utah, or 
any other state, government, or country, or who is 
addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or any 
person who has been declared mentally incompetent 
shall not own or have in his possession or under his 
cusrbody or control any dangerous weapon as defined 
in this part. Any person who violates this section 
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and if the 
dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed off shotgun 
he shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
In order to determine whether or not one comes within trie class 
of those convicted of any crime of violence, it is necessary to refer 
to Sec. 76-10-501 (5), Utah Code Annotated, 1973, which defines "crime 
of violence" as follows: 
"Crime of violence" means murder, voluntary manslaughter, 
rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, 
extortion, or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, 
9 
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assault with intent to commit any offense punishable 
by imprisonment for more than one year, arson punish-
able by imprisonment for more than one year, or an 
attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses. 
Clearly, from this definition, some acts which are crimes of 
violence in the ordinary sense of the word (ie., stricking another with 
a fist) are not crimes of violence, while other acts, which are fre-
quently done in the utmost peace and quiet (ie., burglary and house-
breaking) are so classified. Some of the offenses proscribed are felonies 
while others may be misdemeanors. The evidence against the defendant 
shows a conviction in 1969 for assault with a deadly weapon with 
intent to do bodily harm. This is not one of the enumerated crimes of 
violence; however, the state would have us consider it to be the same 
thing as rassault with a dangerous weapon,f There is not now, nor has 
there ever been, an offense in this state known as 'assault with a 
dangerous weapon.' Since no such crime has existed, it is not possible 
to compare the elements of the defendant's crime with those of 'assault 
with a dangerous weapon;' moreover, the record does not reflect what 
weapon the defendant used in 1969 and so we cannot determine whether 
or not it comes within the definition of dangerous weapons given in 
76-10-501 (l). By comparing the old and new assault provisions one 
can perceive great differences between what conduct constituted 
assault under 76-7-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that which may 
now be denominated assault under 76-5-102, Utah Code Annotated, 1973-
Which definition are we to apply in determining whether or not, in 1969, 
10 
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William Coleman committed an assault with a dangerous weapon? The common-
law definition is of no avail since the legislature specifically abol-
ished common law crimes and provided that no act could be considered 
a crime unless the conduct was so classified by statute or ordinance. 
Sec. 76-1-105, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 1974* Thus merely deter-
mining whether or not one comes within the proscribed class of persons 
requires, in many cases, a labyrinthine search through the present and 
past criminal codes and, even then, is subject to uncertainty.. 
The Utah Supreme Court dealt with a similar problem in State 
v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d. 343, 453 P. 2d. 146 (1969). In that case the 
legislature had enacted overlapping statutes. Shondel was charged with 
a violation of the Drug Abuse Control Law which provided as punishment 
for his violation not more than one year imprisonment and/or a fine 
of not more than $1,000.00, or both. This law also provided, however, 
that if an offense covered therein was also covered by any other law, 
then the provisions of the latter would apply; the latter, the simult-
aneously enacted Narcotic Drug Act treated the same offense as a felony. 
Thus, in order to discern the legislated punishment, one had to persue 
the entire Drug Control Law, find the provision referring to "other law" 
and then search throughout the existing laws of Utah to find the pro-
vision in the Narcotic Drug Act. In ruling that imposing the felony 
punishment would be a denial of due process and equal protection of the 
laws, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
11 
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"The well-established rule is that a statute creating a crime 
should be sufficiently certain that persons of ordinary inte-
lligence who desire to obey the law may know how to conduct 
themselves in conformity with it. A fai£ and logical concom-
itant of that rule is that such a penal statute should be 
similarly clear, specific and understandable as to the penalty 
imposed for its violation." 
Section 76-10-503, U.C.A. 1973* is thus so void and vague that 
"persons of ordinary intelligence who desire to obey the law" are 
totally incapable, in many cases, of determining whether or not they 
are a "restricted person". Depending on the individual situation, an 
individual who suspects he may be included in the class of restricted 
persons must compare statutes which bear no relation to the Utah Criminal 
Code to the offenses enumerated in Section 76-10-501 (5) and is called 
upon to render a judgment as to whether or not they are the same. This 
process resembles nothing so much as comparing apples and oranges. 
Since we have no common law crimes, may we define these offenses accor-
ding to their common-law definition? Is burglary of an auto, which was 
not burglary at common law, once was burglary under our Penal Code, and 
is now a separate offense and a Class A misdemeanor, burglary within 
the meaning of this provision? Is trespassing, when in a residence, 
housebreaking; an interesting question since, like assault with a 
dangerous weapon, a crime by that name is unknown to our law. The 
difficulties of interpretation presented by this statute are immense, 
not only in the case at bar, but in virtually half of the possible sit-
uations that might come within the definition. We cannot expect William 
12 
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Coleman, or any other citizen, to be able to determine -whether or not 
he or she falls -within this class. The enforcement of this statute is 
clearly repugnant to the requirements of due process and equal pro-
tection of the laws. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT CANNOT HE CONVICTED OF A FELONY SINCE 
THE STATUTE FAILS TO MAKE CLEAR WHICH OF THE TWO 
PUNISHMENTS PROVIDED THEREIN IS APPLICABLE TO THE 
ACCUSED. 
Further ambiguity is provided us by the provision that illegal 
possession of a dangerous "weapon is a class A misdemeanor unless the 
weapon is l!a firearm or a sawed-off shotgun," in -which case it is a 
third degree felony. Prior to reading the statutory definition of 
"firearm" given by legislature in Section 76-10-501 (2), U.C.A. as 
amended, 1974, most persons -would undoubtedly think they knew "what a 
firearm -was. The statutory definition, however, is as follows: 
"Firearms" means pistols, revolvers, sawed-off shotguns, 
or sawed-off rifles, and/or any device that could be used 
as a weapon from which is expelled a projectile by any 
force. 
Since the weapon defendant possessed was a rifle we must now 
consider whether or not a rifle is a firearm within the meaning and 
intent of this definition. Clearly a rifle is neither a pistol, revol-
ver, sawed-off shotgun or sawed-off rifle. If the legislature had 
meant to include rifles, or for that matter, shotguns, as firearms, 
it would not have been necessary to specify, and later in section 
13 
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76-10-501 (3), define the sawed-off variety. Equally clear, a rifle 
is by its nature always a weapon and is therefore not merely a "device 
that could be used as a weapon." (emphasis added) 
An examination of all statutes in Part 5 of Chapter 10 of the 
Penal Code provides further indication that the term "firearm" as 
defined by legislature in that part was not intended to include rifles 
but the legislature was by no means, consistant. The following examples 
of this inconsistancy aptly demonstrate the problem. 
Section 76-10-502 defines a loaded "weapon" as being "any 
pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle or other weapon described in this 
part..." Nowhere is the word "firearm"used. If rifles and shotguns 
were firearms there would have been no need to specify the types of 
weapons but the statute would merely have said that a firearm would 
be deemed loaded under the circumstances set out therein. 
Both Sections 76-10-503 and 504 increase the degree of offense 
when the weapon is a "firearm or sawed-off shotgun." Since 76-10-501 
(2) specifically defines a sawed-off shotgun as a firearm there seems 
to be no purpose at all for this phraseology. 
Section 76-10-505 prohibits carrying a loaded firearm in 
certain places without further elaboration on what is or is not a fire-
arm. 
Section 76-10-506 is really a curious statute; entitled 
"Brandishing firearm or using firearm in quarrel," the substantive 
14 
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portion of the statute says not one "word about firearms or any type 
of gun but only a "dangerous weapon," "which could be a knife or just 
about anything else. 
Section 76-10-507 prohibits discharging "any kind of firearm" 
from a vehicle. The use of the phrase "any kind" seems to indicate an 
intent to cover firearms not included in the statutory definition of 
the term. 
Additional confusion is supplied by the fact that the part 
defines a sawed-off shotgun or rifle -with great particularity and 
separately from the firearm definition but never once treats these 
weapons as any different from firearms in general. Thus the entire 
five line definition seems to serve no purpose whatsoever. 
A rifle is clearly a dangerous weapon within the definition 
of Section 76-10-501 (l). Thus, if this statute is upheld as constit-
utional this defendant cannot be convicted of a felony. As was clearly 
enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Shondel, supra, "...where there 
is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two punishments is applicable 
to an offense, an accused is entitled to the benefit of the lesser." 
CONCLUSION 
The application of Section 76-10-503, U.C.A., as amended, 1973, 
to this defendant is forbidden by the prohibition of the Utah Constit-
ution against ex post facto laws. It is, additionally, so vague in 
defining the class of restricted persons that enforcement of the 
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statute against anyone not clearly -within its scope is violative of 
due process and the right to equal protection of the laws. The punish-
ment provision of the statute similarly fails to clearly include rifles 
and thus the defendant cannot, in any case, be punished as for a felony. 
Respeetjfullj? submitted, 
RITA G. tJftMES 
Attorney for D&fendant-Appellant 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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